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Chapter 9
Early Retirement Windows
Charles Brown

Despite legal prohibitions on mandatory retirement rules in the United
States, American firms still have a number of tools for influencing the retirement decisions of their workers. Pension plans, particularly those with earlyretirement provisions, have received a good deal of attention from economists, as have wages (and wage-rate increases) in the pre-retirement years.
Less studied are special early retirement windows, which offer for a limited
time additional incentives for workers to retire. These are often called "window" offers.
Such windows are worth studying for at least three reasons. First, they are
generally thought to have become more frequent, as firms attempt to downsize and the cuts are felt at management levels where firms have traditionally been reluctant to adopt permanent layoffs. Second, they represent
an interesting response to age-discrimination legislation that has outlawed
mandatory retirement and somewhat restricted the use of regular pension
plans to achieve the same goal. Moreover, such offers are sometimes argued
to themselves be discriminatory, since they tend to focus on older workers
and are said to be seen by some older workers as only slightly subtler than a
dead fish on the desk as a signal that it's time to move on. Third, such offers
are often unanticipated by workers, certainly as of the time when they initially accepted employment with the firm and often even shortly before the
window is opened. Consequently, if one worries that generous regular retirement plans have attracted workers who planned to retire early anyway
(and so discount evidence that generous retirement plans encourage retirement) , the unanticipated nature of special early-retirement windows makes
them a particularly attractive quasi-experiment (Gustman, Mitchell, and
Steinmeier 1994).1
Systematic evidence regarding the effect of such windows is limited. Most
previous work has focused on responses to early retirement windows offered
by a single employer. 2 In addition to worries about representatives of the
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employers studied, one can't observe in employer-based data whether workers subsequently work for other firms, and if so whether their earnings are
substantial. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) therefore included a
series of questions about such special early retirement windows. The analysis
in this chapter is based on the first two waves of the HRS, conducted in 1992
and 1994.
We begin by outlining the economic theory underlying the firm's decision to offer a window and the worker's decision whether to accept. Then
the characteristics of window offers and the workers who receive them are
analyzed. Next, work and retirement outcomes for workers who received
window offers are compared to those who did not. Finally, multivariate analyses of receiving a window offer and the decision to accept it are summarized, and conclusions are offered.

Window Theory
Employers decide whether to offer an early-out window and, if so, the terms
of the offer; workers decide whether to accept such offers. While the worker's decision has been considered in some detail in the retirement literature, modeling the employer'S decision requires pulling together themes
from several different literatures.

Offering a Window
An employer may be thought of as offering an early-out window when a

reduction in employment is desirable, and an early-out window is an efficient way of achieving that reduction. Unlike the regular early retirement
provisions of pension plans that are driven by steady-state considerations, a
special early-retirement window presumably reflects a change in the firm's
preferred level or skill-pattern of employment.
Reductions in a firm's overall demand for labor may be temporary or
permanent. If temporary, the firm will want to reduce employment of those
workers in whom it has invested the least; those with greater levels of firmspecific skills will remain employed so that they will be available (without
new hiring and training costs) when demand recovers (Oi 1962; Becker
1993). Permanent reductions in demand for labor should lead to roughly
proportional cuts at all skill levels, unless the production function is nonhomothetic. Changes in product technology or in the composition of product demand can lead to changes in the employer's desired skill mix and lead
to reductions in demand for those whose skills have become obsolete. Given
a desire to reduce employment of some or all groups of workers, why would
a firm pay workers to leave, rather than unilaterally severing their employment? One answer is that layoffs have their own cost - such workers can
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claim unemployment insurance, and at least part of the cost of the incremental benefits is reflected in the firm's payroll taxes for the VI program
(Brechling 1977; Topel 1983; Anderson and Meyer 1993). By inducing quits
and therefore reducing layoffs, early-out windows might reduce the firm's
VI liability.
On closer analysis, however, early-out windows prove to be a relatively
expensive way of cutting VI liabilities. Laid-off workers typically qualify for
six months of unemployment benefits, at up to half their previous earnings.
Each state has a maximum benefit, however, and workers with above-average
earnings receive less than half their previous earnings in VI benefits. So in a
worst case, where all workers file for benefits, receive benefits equal to half
of their previous pay, and fully exhaust benefits before finding new work,
and the benefits are fully experience rated, a layoff will cost the firm three
months pay. For highly paid workers, the VI tax is much less than that.
By contrast, as we shall see, early-out windows are often worth at least
three months pay, and are typically offered to well-paid workers. This suggests that some other "cost" of layoffs must account for the employer's
offering early-out windows.
The key to understanding this cost is recognizing that, in normal times,
both workers and employers benefit from long-term employment relationships. Workers' willingness to share the cost of acquiring employer-specific
skills depends on a belief that the employment relationship will continue
and promised wage premiums will be received. Both firms and workers gain
from deferred-compensation contracts in which workers are motivated to
work hard when they are young by the promise of above-market pay when
they are older (Lazear 1979). Indeed, the typical merit grid rewards superior performance in one period with an increase in base pay; the value of
that increase is clearly contingent on the worker's expectation of continued
employment. Finally, long-term employment contracts can be seen as a type
of insurance that risk-averse workers purchase from risk-neutral firms. Earlyout windows are then offered when the firm decides that continuing the
employment relationship on the implicitly agreed-on terms is no longer
desirable.
This perspective suggests that early-out windows should be offered to
those workers who have relatively stable, long-term employment relationships. To the extent that such arrangements are more common for those
who work for large or unionized firms,~ and among skilled rather than
unskilled workers, we should expect early-out windows to be most common
for these workers, too.
The hypothesis that early-out windows will be offered to stably-employed
"advantaged" workers is strengthened by consideration of another alternative for the firm -waiting for workers to quit voluntarily. In markets where
turnover rates are high, it is cheaper to wait than to pay.
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Accepting a Window Offer
The worker's decision to accept or reject a window offer has been studied
in the retirement literature, most notably by Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise
(1990). They carefully model a worker's decision to leave the firm now,
relative to later retirement dates. Implicitly, the alternative to working with
the current firm in their model is withdrawing from the labor force, because
alternative employment is not explicitly considered. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) suggest that "partial retirement," moving to a new job that
usually pays less but allows a shorter workweek, is an empirically important
alternative to retiring altogether, though its importance for workers covered
by special early-out options has not been addressed.
Of course, these models predict - and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise confirm - that workers are more likely to accept offers that are more generous.
Another important implication is that a given offer is more attractive to a
worker who would have retired soon anyway. Moreover, early-out windows
should be accepted by those who are pessimistic about their prospects with
the firm, and value their alternatives - either withdrawing from the labor
force or working elsewhere - most favorably. A subtler implication is that
window offers may be accepted precisely because they are a sign that employment stability and traditional wage increases are less certain if one
remains with the firm.

Working Backward
The process by which workers decide whether to accept window offers relates back to the firm's decision to offer them in two ways. First, worker
decisions about whether to accept determine how generous offers must be
in order to achieve a given number of departures. Second, worker decisions
determine whether the employer is losing the "right" workers. Layoffs, perhaps with severance payments, can be targeted directly to those workers
whose net value to the firm is smallest. Early-out windows introduce selfselection by workers. To the extent that the offers are accepted by workers
who are relatively unproductive, they provide a relatively efficient way for
the firm to reduce employment while maintaining the promise of stable employment. But if departures are motivated by good outside prospects, those
who accept window offers may be those the firm would least want to lose.

Window Offers and Those Who Receive Them
The data analyzed in this chapter relate to those age-eligible members of the
HRS sample who were interviewed in both of the first two waves (1992 and
1994). In Wave 1, all respondents who were currently employed or who had
ever worked for pay for "more than a few months" and had last worked in
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1972 or later - i.e., virtually all those who had worked in the last twenty
years-were asked a sequence of questions on any window offers they had
ever received. In Wave 2, those who worked at all between Wave 1 and
Wave 2 were asked about window offers received since Wave 1. Early retirement windows are defined as special offers available only at a particular
time, and so do not include the normal "early retirement" features of many
pension plans. The placement of this sequence in the survey- after detailed pension questions about current and past jobs have already been
asked - should have reinforced this distinction.
Among our 8,933 age-eligible respondents, 679 respondents (7.6 percent
of the sample) reported that they had received one or more such window
offers. Using sampling weights increases this proportion to 8.8 percent.
Nearly 30 percent of those who received such an offer received more than
one, almost always from the same employer.
Of those receiving special early retirement offers, 42 percent accepted the
first offer they received; of those receiving more than one, a similar fraction
(36 percent) accepted the most recent offer. Overall, counting offers between the first and last for those receiving more than two, about 34 percent
of all offers were accepted. 4 This is not very different from the estimates
based on surveys by private consulting companies- 30 percent by Hewitt
Associates (Shalowitz 1993) and 33 percent by Charles D. Spencer and Associates 1992) - or the 30 percent acceptance rate in Hogarth's (1988) New
York State data. Of all individuals who received an offer (or more than one),
just over half had accepted.

Window Offers by Age and Year
While a great deal is known about the early retirement options that are
standard features of many pension plans, less is known about the ages at
which individuals typically receive special early-retirement-window offers.
Two related questions are whether the incidence of such windows has been
increasing over time, and the extent to which windows are under-reported
in the HRS. Table 1 addresses these questions, by presenting the number of
windows offered by year and birth cohort. 5 Reading down the columns, we
see the number of offers for HRS respondents from different birth cohorts
(and hence different current ages) in anyone year; reading across a row
shows the history of offers for anyone cohort; reading down the highlighted
diagonal block shows the number of offers received in each year by those
age 53-58 in that year.
One clear message from Table 1 is that early-out windows are apparently
received throughout the 51-63 age range. Age 51 is not "too young" to get
such an offer, and 63 is not near enough to "normal" retirement to discourage special efforts by employers. There is also a sharp increase in the
number of offers in 1991-92 over earlier years. One can see the same pat-
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TABLE I:

Birth
Cohort

1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1931-41
Accepted
offered

Proportion of the Population Receiving an Early-Retiremen t Window
Offer, by Birth Cohort and Year
1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1.33%
2.02
0.87
0.91
2.09
2.06
1.66
1.52
1.89
2.78
2.26
1.75
.25

1.62%
1.50
1.80
2.81
2.00
2.53
1.94
2.25
1.62
2.25
1.72
2.06
.35

2.64%
2.15
2.75
1.82
2.41
2.86
2.14
2.42
1.75
1.99
2.24
2.27
.35

2.99%
1.05
2.10
2.11
2.04
1.72
0.84
1.14
0.36
1.21
1.67
1.54
.37

1.27%
1.08
0.95
0.50
1.25
1.54
0.58
1.36
0.60
0.37
0.31
0.84
.37

0.69%
1.10
1.08
0.83
0.15
0.61
0.62
0.36
0.08
0.36
0.15
0.54
.36

Source: Author's calculations using HRS data.
Note: 1994 data are for months prior to Wave 2 interview, which was centered onJuly.

tern along the highlighted diagonal block: those who were age 53-58 in
1991-92 were more likely to receive window offers than those who were 5358 in earlier years. The table hides a substantial increase in offers between
1993 and 1994: because the period prior to the Wave 2 interview includes all
of 1993 but on average 7 months of the following year, offers for all of 1994
were probably more than half again as numerous as reported in Table 1. 6
The sharp increase in window offers over time is consistent with two quite
different interpretations: that such offers have increased dramatically in recent years, or that people tend to forget such offers over time. There are, unfortunately, no other consistently collected data on early-retirement windows that could serve as a benchmark for Table 1. 7 One plausible conjecture
is that, if respondents are under-reporting window offers received in earlier
years, such under-reporting is more likely for offers that were not accepted.
Accepted offers generate significant changes - a change of employer and
often a cash bonus or significant change in one's pension entitlement (more
on that below) - and so should be salient enough to be recalled and reported. In response to this conjecture, the last line of Table 1 presents the
fraction of offers accepted by age-eligible respondents in each year. With
the exception of 1994 (where there seem to be "too few" accepted offers),
the pattern for accepted offers is very much like that for all offers, and the
fraction of offers accepted does not diverge in any consistent way from the
36 percent rate for the entire 1989-93 period. This admittedly indirect test
suggests that much of the reported increase in window offers over time
reflects a genuine increase, and not partial recall of more distant offers. 8
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Whatever one makes of the reported increase in windows in recent years,
accepted early-out windows are now a significant component of total turnover for workers in this age range. Between Waves 1 and 2, 26 percent of
those who were initially wage and salary workers left their Wave-l employers;
accepted window offers account for 10 percent of these departures.

What Incentives Are Offered?
For those who receive window offers, HRS obtains relatively detailed information about the characteristics of the offers. These include whether the
special retirement incentive offered took the form of a cash bonus, temporary cash payments, better pension benefits, and/ or other benefits. Both
the forms of the benefit and the amount were recorded. Table 2 describes
these offers, separately for those who reject (all) offers and those who accept
an (any) offer. For simplicity, I focus on the first offer received for the 30
percent of the sample who received more than one. 9 Dollar amounts are
converted to constant 1992 dollars using the CPI.
Cash bonuses are slightly more common among rejected window offers,
but the conditional mean bonus is higher for the accepted offers. The
median and the unconditional means (i.e., treating those who were not
offered a cash bonus as zero) are only slightly higher for accepted offers.
Temporary cash payments (typically, until age 62) are much less common
than simple cash bonuses, but are a bit more likely to be part of accepted
offers than rejected ones.
Offers of additional pension benefits are both more common and more
generous for accepted window offers than for those that were rejected. The
same goes for pension plan credits for extra years of service. Accepted offers
are more likely to include medical insurance, but they are less likely to
include "other" incentives. Overall, while not all the differences are statistically significant, accepted offers are "better" than rejected ones. IO Given
that those who accepted offers had similar earnings to those who rejected
them, II the generally better terms among the accepted offers is quite in line
with an economic model of the decision to accept such offers.
Table 2 is constructed to highlight differences between accepted and
rejected offers. But it is also important to note that amounts on offer in
either column are impressive. Even for rejected offers, cash offers amounted
to $23,000, while improved pensions averaged $4,000 per year. An extra
pension credit of 3.6 years represents about a 15 percent increase (given
average tenure of 23 years). Typically, an offer would be either cash or improved pension benefits, rather than both. 12
Given the serious sums at stake, it is perhaps not surprising that threefourths of those who accept the window offer describe it as important to
their decision to retire at that time (rather than something they would do
anyway). Those who reject the window offer are asked whether doubling the
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TABLE

2:

Window Offers: What Is Being Offered?

Cash bonus: Yes=l
Cash bonus:
mean ($000)
median ($000)
Cash bonus/annual earnings
Temporary cash: Yes=l
Extra pension: Yes=1
Extra pension:
mean/year ($000)
median/year ($000)
Extra pension/ earnings
Pension credit: Yes=l
Pension credit: years
Perm. medical insurance: Yes=l
Temp. medical insurance: Yes=1
Other incentive: Yes=l

(All) Offers Rejected

Offer Accepted

(N=327)

(N=352)

.57

.51

22.99
(18.60)
22.40
.54
(.41)
.04
.26

31.65*
(37.40)
24.00
.64*
(.44)
.06
.33*

3.99
(5.43)
2.00
.10
(.13)
.13
3.58
(2.21)
.02
.02
.08

6.16
(8.57)
3.60
.14
(.16)
.17
4.47
(2.28)
.07*
.03
.05

Source: Author's calculations using HRS data.
Notes: For continuous variables, standard deviations are in parentheses below means. Means,
medians and standard deviations of continuous variables are conditional- i.e., zeros are excluded. Results based on weighted data. * = significantly different (t2:1.96) from the mean for
..all offers rejected."

offer would change their decision. Only a third reported that it would,
which I find more surprising.

Who Receives Early Retirement Window Offers?
Who Accepts Them?
Charactelistics of HRS workers who received window offers are summaIized
in Table 3, for those who accepted their (first) offer and those who declined
it. (With nearly equal numbers of workers in the "accept" and "reject"
groups, the characteristics of all window recipients are a simple average of
those two columns.) Also presented for comparison are characteristics of
age-eligible individuals who did not receive such offers (but were employed
or had worked at some time since 1972 and so could have reported receiving
one).
Those receiving window offers are more advantaged economically than
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3: Characteristics of Workers by Window Status
Never Offered
Window

(All) Offer(s)
Rejected

Offer Accepted

Worker Characteristic

N=7591

(N=327)

(N=352)

Male
Black
Hispanic
Never married
Married now
Married, spouse works
Years of schooling

.49*
.10
.05*
.04
.73*
.48
12.42**
(2.92)
.81 **
.83**
.20**
6.46
(2.93)
4.28
(3.17)
.39
.23**
255.34
(546.15)
114
1936.19**
(3.17)

.69
.09
.04
.04
.78
.56
13.81
(2.68)
.92
.90
.08
6.70
(2.83)
4.38
(3.14)
.40
.16
225.12
(411.34)
137
1936.33
(3.33)

.69
.08
.02
.03
.76
.44*
13.86
(2.66)
.90
.89
.13
6.53
(2.86)
4.34
(3.26)
.42
.23*
327.01*
(546.43)
208
1934.80*
(3.09)

Physical health ~ good
Emotional health ~ good
Health limits work
Will live to 75 (0-10)
Will live to 85 (0-10)
Financial horizon ~ 5 yrs
Accept financial risk
Wealth mean ($000)
median ($000)
Year of birth

Source: Author's calculations using HRS data.
Notes: See Table 2. ** significantly different from the mean for all those receiving an offer (last
two colums combined).

those who did not: they are more likely to be married males, they have on
average a year and a half more schooling, they are healthier (though their
estimates of their probabilities to living to age 75 or 85 are no higher),
and they are wealthier. They are marginally more willing to accept a hypothetical job that offers a 50-50 chance of doubling or reducing family income by one third, but there is no significant difference in their financial
planning horizons.
Differences between those who accept and those who reject offers are less
marked, but nonetheless interesting. Those who accept offers are less likely
to have a working spouse than are those who reject the offer. They are more
likely to report that a health condition limits their work, though they are
very similar on the other health measures. Those who accept offers are more
likely to report that they would accept the hypothetical risky alternative job.
It is not clear whether this finding should have been expected. On the one
hand, as we will see later, a significant fraction of those who accept windows

262

Charles Brown

TABU: 4: Job Characteristics ofWorkers by Window Status

Job Characteristic
In (wage/hom)
Usual homs/week
Durable Mfg.
Trans & Pub Utilities
Public Administration
Manager
Professional
Mech & Repair
Tenure (years)
Union contract
Company size 2: 500
Pension: DB
Pension: DC
Pension: DB + DC

Never Offered
Window
N=7509**

(All) Offer(s)
Rejected
N=327

Offer Accepted
N=352

2.38
(.59)
40.61
(13.45)
.11
.06
.04
.15
.14
.03
12.48
(10.90)
.20
.50
.22
.16
.11

2.90
(.47)
42.10
(7.66)
.18
.19
.11
.16
.34
.08
23.18
(8.81)
.56
.82
.50
.08
.38

2.98*
(.50)
43.25
(8.91)
.22
.25
.09
.23*
.27
.09
25.52*
(8.93)
.52*
.85*
.67*
.08
.23*

Source: Author's calculations using HRS data.
Notes: * = significantly different (t ~ 1.96) from the mean for "all offers rejected." ** = significantly different from the mean for all those receiving an offer. For those who rejected or
accepted window offers, job characteristics are from the employer who first offered a window;
for those who never received a window offer,job characteristics are from current/last employer
at wave 1. Union status and employer size are missing if window offer is from employer before
current/ last employer at wave 1.

later work with another employer. On the other hand, rejecting a window
offered by a downsizing firm involves the risk of subsequent layoff. Those
who accept window offers are wealthier than those who reject them (and it
will turn out that the difference is larger than can be accounted for by the
window payments themselves).
Table 4 presents differences in job characteristics of those who did and did
not receive window offers. For those who received an offer, the job characteristics are those of the job that was held at the time of the offer; for those
who did not receive an offer, I focused on their current/last job. Broadly,
the finding from Table 3 that those who receive window offers are relatively
advantaged workers is if anything stronger in Table 4: they are more likely to
be employed in high-wage industries, to report their occupation is (or was)
managerial or professional, they worked for their employer about twice as
long, and they are more likely to be covered by union contracts and to work
for large firms. '3 It therefore is no surprise that those who receive window
offers earn more than those who do not, though the magnitude of the

Retirement Windows

TABLE

263

5: Job-related Expectations at Wave 1 and Real Wage Growth on Wave-I Job
by Window Status Between Waves 1 and 2
No Window
Offered
N=4591

How likely is layoff in next year (0-10)
Expect real earnings change (+1,0, -1)
Chances of finding equaljob (0-10)
Chances ofworking past age 62 (0-10)

1.76
(2.57)
.48
(.64)
4.53**
(3.73)
4.70**
(3.92)

(All) Offers
Rejected
N=208

1.30
(2.28)
.51
(.61)
3.50
(3.69)
3.93
(3.79)

Offer
Accepted
N=128

1.91 *
(2.92)
.27*
(.77)
3.03
(3.40)
2.89*
(3.58)

Notes: See Table 4.

difference (those who received offers earned about 40 percent more per
hour than those who didn't) may be. 14 Finally, those who received window
offers are almost always covered by a defined benefit pension plan: windows
are offered to workers who have an expectation of quasi-permanent employment, and such pensions contribute to and perhaps symbolize that stability.
Among those who receive window offers, differences between those who
accept and those who reject them are once again strikingly small, and conform to no simple pattern.
Workers' expectations about the future with their current employers, the
difficulty of finding new jobs, and plans for future labor force participation
potentially influence the decision to accept window offers. These variables
were measured in Wave 1, for those who were working at that time. This
means we cannot relate these variables to window outcomes prior to Wave 1,
but we can compare Wave-l values of those who accepted, rejected, or did
not receive window offers between Wave 1 and Wave 2 (Table 5) .
Those who receive window offers between Wave 1 and Wave 2 do not (at
Wave 1) view their chances of being laid off any differen tly from those who
did not receive a window offer. Furthermore, they have similar expectations
about real wage growth on their job over the next several years. Those who
receive window offers do think it would be harder to find a comparable job
in the same line of work if they were to lose their current job. This is consistent with earlier evidence that windows are offered to workers with longterm attachment to their employers. Those who receive offers believe (at
Wave 1, prior to receiving the offer) they are less likely to work past age 62 or
65. As Lazear (1979) emphasized, employment contracts that lead workers
to remain with the firm often have features (once mandatory retirement;
now subtle pension incentives) that discourage workers from staying too
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long. Viewed from this perspective, those who do not expect to be working
past age 62 are also likely to be workers with strong attachment to their
employers.
Several differences between those who reject window offers and those
who accept them are apparent. Those who accept window offers see layoffs
as more likely, and wage growth less favorable, than those who reject them;
and they see themselves as less likely to work beyond age 62. These differences are all in the expected direction: windows are accepted by workers
who see the option of remaining with their employer as less valuable.
For those employed at Wave 1, HRS asked about their wage when they
began working for their Wave 1 employers. Real wage growth per year with
the Wave 1 employer is positively correlated with workers' expectation of
future real wage growth, but is not related to either receiving or accepting a
window offer. The wage-growth variable depends on respondents' recollection of their pay more than a decade ago, and so no doubt is not well
measured. A verdict on the relationship between past wage growth and
windows must wait for a more reliable measure of such growth.

Life Beyond the Window
Most previous analyses of early-{)ut windows are based on payroll records of
the employer offering the window. This means that little is known about
what happens to workers who accept windows. Do they stop working altogether or take jobs with other employers? Do those who take new jobs
work full time and earn about as much as on the job they left? Or do they
move to "partial retirement" jobs with shorter hours and significantly lower
pay? How do those who accept windows and "retire" characterize their
retirement? These questions are important to employers interested in designing these programs.
To start answering these questions, Table 6 characterizes employment
and retirement status at Wave 2 for those who accepted, rejected, or never
received a window offer. Nearly half (45 percent) of those who accepted a
window offer are employed at Wave 2. A significant fraction (13 percent of
all those who accept windows, or nearly a third of those who are working)
are self-employed. Half of those who accept windows characterize themselves as completely retired, while 28 percent say they are partially retired. As
one would expect, those who accept window offers are less likely to be
employed, and more likely to report themselves retired, than those never
received such offers and those who rejected all early-out offers.
Among those who describe themselves as "completely retired" at Wave 2,
those who accepted window offers report having a much more satisfactory
retirement experience. Compared to those not offered windows, those who
accept a window offer are much more likely to say they wanted to retire
(rather than being forced to do so), that they are satisfied with their retire-
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6: Employment Status and Retirement Status at Wave 2 by Window Status

Never
Offered
Window

Offers
Rejected

Offer
Acr-epted

Employed
Self-employed
Completely retired
Partially retired

.69
.14
.18
.10

.89
.01
.09
.03

.45
.13
.51
.28

A?nang completely retired
Wanted to retire
Forced to retire
Very satisfied w/ retirement
Not at all satisfied w/ retirement
Better than before
Worse than before

.46
.47
.48
.18
.44
.27

A mong completely retired with no health limitations
Wanted to retire
.75
Forced to retire
.15
.74
Very satisfied w/ retirement
Not at all satisfied w/ retirement
.03
Better than before
.65
.05
Worse than before

(All)

.67
.19
.70
.03
.57
.11

.77
.11
.75
.00
.62
.06

Source: Author's calculations using HRS data.

ment, and that they are better off than before retiring. However, the bottom
panel of Table 6 reveals that this difference vanishes if we restrict our analysis to those with no health problem that limits their work. The negative
overall descriptions of retirement among those who have never been offered a window is due to the fact that those who are in poor health fare less
well in retirement, and that, in this age range (53-63, at Wave 2) those who
retire without a window offer are likely to be in poorer health. Nonetheless,
the lack of significant differences between healthy retirees who did and did
not take window offers is hard to square with the "defenestration" view that
workers who accept window offers often feel they have little choice in the
matter and so are pushed through the window.
Table 7 compares the workweek and wages of those who are employed
after accepting a window offer (from another employer) to those who rejected window offers. For those who reject a window offer, hours per week
and inflation-adjusted hourly wages are (on average) just what they were
when the window was offered. Among those who accept offers, however,
those who return to work do so for somewhat shorter work weeks (11 hours
per week) and substantially lower wages. While it is tempting to link the
wage losses of those who accept window offers and then work elsewhere to
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TABLE

7: Hours Worked and Wages, Before and After Window Offer
(All)
Offers
Rejected

Offer
Accepted

Windowjob

Hours/week
Weeks/year
In(wage/hour) mean
median
N

42.10
(7.66)
49.89
(5.55)
2.90
(.47)
2.85
320

43.25
(8.91)
49.57
(6.87)
2.98*
(.50)
2.97
343

42.17
(8.62)
49.92
(5.44)
2.90
(.45)
2.88
266

33.04*
(15.50)
45.72*
(12.03)
2.45*
(.72)
2.25
124

0.09
(7.90)
0.03
(5.00)
-.02
(.37)
-.00
262

-10.99*
(16.82)
-4.03*
(11.39)
-.53*
(.69)
-.50
124

Wave2Job

Hours/week
Weeks/year
In(wage/hour) mean
median
N
Wave 2 window
Hours/week

Weeks/year
In(wage/hour) mean
median
N

Source: Author's calculations using HRS data.
Sample sizes are for In(wage/hour}; means of hours/week and weeks/year are based on
slightly larger samples. * = significantly different (t ~ 1.96) from the mean for "all offers
rejected."

the tendency of window acceptors to become self-employed, we obtain almost the same wage loss when analysis is restricted to those whose Wave-2
job is working for someone else.

Multivariate Analyses
Three questions remain that are best answered with multivariate analyses.
(1) Does the tendency for windows to be offered to advantaged workers with
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strong "permanent" attachment to the firm hold when various measures of
advantage and attachment are considered simultaneously? (2) How important are the details of the window offer and the worker's expectations about
where his/her current job is heading in explaining the decision of workers
to accept the offer, once the characteristics of the jobs and workers are held
constant? (3) How different are offer and acceptance rates for those who
have already turned down one or more such offers?
The analyses here focus on windows offered between Wave I and Wave 2,
and workers' responses to these offers. Above we noted that workers' expectations about layoffs, wage growth, and alternative jobs were strongly related
to workers' decisions to accept window offers. These variables are first measured at Wave I. Employer size and union status are not known for some
employers. 15 These gaps and subtler problems with continuously measuring
other time-varying variables make it difficult to include windows offered
prior to Wave I in a formal analysis.
The first column ofTable 8 shows the effect ofworker and job characteristics on the probability of receiving a window offer between Wave I and
Wave 2. As was true in the analysis of those who had ever received a window
offer, the probability of receiving an offer over the two-year period between
Wave I and Wave 2 is higher for males, for those with longer employer tenure, higher wages, and defined benefit pensions, and for unionized workers
and (marginally) for those who work for larger firms. 16 What we learn from
Table 8, then, is that these indicators ofjob attachment contribute individually to the probability of obtaining a window even when other factors are
held constant.
Adding the number of window offers received prior to Wave 1 to this
specification does not change the coefficients in Table 8 significantly, but its
coefficient is strongly and significantly positive. As windows have become
more common, so too has receiving several such offers ("refenestrations").
As workers become aware of the possibility that windows may not be a oncein-a-lifetime opportunity, structural modeling of the worker's decision becomes even more complicated.
The second column of Table 8 attempts to explain the decision to accept
or reject windows offered between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Given the much
smaller sample size, and the few differences between those who accept and
reject offers in the earlier tables, one should approach this analysis with
limited expectations. A few of the stronger results of the earlier tables are
reversed, given Table 8's smaller sample and many control variables: those
whose health limits their work are less likely to accept (though those in good
health are less likely to do so, which makes sense); and those willing to
accept risky jobs are less likely (in Table 8) to accept the window offer. On
the other hand, those who expected at Wave I that their wages would increase in real terms were again less likely to accept the window offer, as were
those who expected to work past age 62. The influence of the details of the
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TABLE 8: Window Offers and Acceptances

Accept

Get
Window

Window

Explanatory variable

Offer

Offer

Male

.03
(.01)
-.04
(.02)
-.02
(.01)
.001
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.02
(.01)
-.004
(.01)
.003
(.002)
.004
(.00)
.05
(.01)
.02
(.01)
-.02
(.01 )
.04
(.01)
.03
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.02
(.01)
.01
(.01)
.002
(.002)
-.001
(.01)
-.00
(.001)
-.002
(.001)

-.12
(.08)
-.08
(.16)
-.07
(.09)
-.08
(.07)
-.31
(.12)
-.03
(.09)
-.26
(.13)
-.01
(.02)
.004
(.004)
.11
(.10)
.08
(.15)
.03
(.18)
.01
(.16)
.01
(.07)
-.05
(.08)
-.05
(.06)
-.13
(.07)
.01
(.01)
-.09
(.04)
-.01
(.01 )
-.02
(.01)
-.03
(.09)
-.40
(.25)
1.22
(.53)

ever married
Married now
Married, spouse working
Physical health

;:=

good

Emotional health ;:= good
Health limits work
Years of schooling
Tenure (years)
In (wage!hour)
Pension: DB
Pension: DC
Pension: DB+DC
Union contract
Firm size

;:=

500

Financial horizon

;:=

5 Yrs

Take risky job
How likely is layoff in next year (0-10)
Expect real wage increase (+1,0, -1)
Chances of finding equally good job (0-10)
Chances of working past age 62 (0-10)
Cash bonus! earnings
Temporary cash! earnings
Extra pension benefits! earnings
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8: Continued

Explanatory variable

Get
Window

Accept
Window

Offer

Offer

Pension credit: years

.02
(.02)

Other incentives/ earnings

.10
(.13)

Temporary medical insurance

-.01

Permanent medical insurance

-.03

(.16)

(.13)

N

4324

307

Soun:e: Author's calculations using HRS data.
Note: Also included in the regressions are variables whose coefficients are not reported in the
table: race/ ethnicity (2), wealth quartile (3), hours worked per week, weeks worked per year,
industry (12), occupation (16).

offer seem less influential in this smaller sample, except for improved pension benefits.
When a variable which identifies those who had received and rejected
window offers prior to Wave 1 is introduced, its coefficient was negative and
moderately significant (- .142 (.073)). However, among those who had rejected an offer prior to Wave 1 but claimed they would have accepted a
doubly generous one, there is no significant difference in accepting the
offer between waves.

Conclusions
Early retirement windows offer, for a limited time, additional incentives (beyond those that might be included in a firm's pension plan) to retire. Their
use has grown over time, and the size of the typical incentive is substantial.
The Health and Retirement Study provides the first opportunity to study
these early retirement windows with a representative sample of workers in
the relevant age range. We confirm some important findings from earlier
studies based on individual firms, and suggest several new conclusions:
1. Employers appear to be offering early-out windows more frequently in
recent years. Receiving more than one offer has become fairly common, and
workers who have received and rejected one such offer are more likely to get
another, but less likely to accept it, than otherwise similar workers.
2. Roughly two-thirds of window offers are rejected. If windows not taken
are less likely to be remembered than offers that actually triggered a departure, this two-thirds would be a lower bound for the true figure. The fact
that most offers are rejected has two implications: (1) Workers may some-
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times feel they have little choice but to accept an early-out offer, but this
cannot be true of most offers; (2) Employers must make significan tly more
offers than they can expect to be accepted, raising the possibility that offers
will be accepted by some workers the firm would rather keep, and be rejected by some that the firm would prefer had accepted.
3. Early-out windows tend to be offered to relatively advantaged workers
who would otherwise have relatively permanent attachment to their firms.
4. The decision to accept windows is only weakly explained by the "usual
suspects" - schooling, age, race, sex, industry, occupation - since they differ little between those who accept and those who reject offers. This should
not be too surprising. Workers with more education have brighter alternatives than workers with less education if they accept the window (more
pension benefits, higher wages if they work elsewhere) and also if they reject
it (higher salary with current employer). Thus, such variables may have little
influence on the decision to accept the window offer or remain with one's
current employer.
5. The financial details of the offers do seem to influence workers' decisions to accept them. Those who accepted offers and those who rejected
them had similar hourly wages but the accepted offers were more generous.
6. The amounts offered are substantial, even taking account of the fact
that window recipients are relatively well paid. Those who rejected cash bonuses were on average rejecting offers of about $23,000, while rejected pension improvements averaged $4,000 pel' year. Accepted offers were higher
still. Thus, if one sees early-retirement windows as unanticipated exogenous
changes in the incentive to remain with an employer, and therefore as a
particularly helpful experiment for assessing the impact of such incentives,
the generosity of the offers reported by HRS respondents is encouraging:
these amounts are large enough to be worth studying. On the other hand,
half of the workers who reject one offer received another offer subsequently,
so that offers after the first may not be strictly exogenous.
7. Roughly half the workers who accept early retirement windows do not
retire altogether from the labor force. Moreover, the average "post-retirement" job represents substantial employment-on average, 30 hours per
week - though hourly wages are significantly lower. These post-retirement
jobs have important implications for modeling responses to such offers: the
alternative to remaining with the firm is often to accept the early-retirement
incentive and work elsewhere, so the fact that HRS allows the analyst to track
such jobs gives it an advantage over data from individual firms' personnel
files (which have better information on the window offer but no data on
subsequent employment). For employers, the fact that those who accept
window offers often work elsewhere raises the possibility that those who
leave are those with the best alternative prospects, not those who are least
productive on their currentjob.
The first two waves of the HRS give us a reasonably detailed picture ofwho
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receives window offers, but relatively limited samples for analyzing the decision to accept the offers, and for learning what happens thereafter to workers who accept them. As the fraction of the sample that received such offers
grows over time, more detailed analyses of these issues will be possible.
The author is grateful to seminar participants at the HRS Early Results
workshop, the Naval Postgraduate School, the University of Chicago, and
the University of Michigan for comments on an earlier version of the work,
and to Mel Stephens and Wei Li for research assistance.

Notes
1. One might still be concerned about how firms decide how generous the window
offered to each worker should be. Moreover, in situations where firms make further
offers to those who initially decline the offer, more generous offers might be correlated with characteristics that make workers unwilling to accept initial offers.
2. Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1990) studied an unnamed Fonune 500 firm;
Hogarth (1988) studied New York State employees; Mehay and Hogan (1998) studied responses of Navy and Air Force personnel.
3. For evidence on whether workers at larger firms have longer tenure with their
employers, see Brown, Medoff, and Hamilton (1990); for evidence on unionization
and tenure, see Freeman and Medoff (1984).
4. As a rule, offers other than the last have been rejected, because the offers come
from the same employer, and accepting an offer leads to terminating one's employment. For respondents who received more than two offers prior to Wave 1, the
outcome ofthe first and last offer was obtained from respondents, and I assume any
offers between these were rejected. Similarly, for respondents who received more
than two offers between Waves 1 and 2 I assume that offers between the first and last
were rejected. Only 9 percent of all offers were inferred in this way to have been
rejected.
5. For those reporting more than two offers at either wave, respondents were asked
to date only the first and last. In constructing Table 1, I assumed that the year of any
other offers was uniformly distributed between the known endpoints. Again, only 9
percent of the offers are affected by this assumption.
6. Offers received in 1992 could be reported either in Wave 1 or Wave 2, depending on whether they occurred before or after the Wave 1 interview. While respondents were reminded when the Wave 1 interview had occurred and asked in Wave 2
about offers since that interview, errors in recalling exactly when an offer occurred
could lead to an offer received shortly after Wave 1 not being reported in Wave 2, or
an offer shortly before Wave 1 being reponed twice. In Wave 1, respondents were
asked the year of the offer, while in Wave 2 month and year were obtained. Eleven
respondents reponed at both Wave 1 and Wave 2 accepting a window in the year of
the Wave 1 interview (and for nine of these, they gave the month of the Wave I
interview at Wave 2); six reponed at Wave 1 that they had rejected a window that year,
and reponed at Wave 2 they had rejected an offer in the month of the Wave 1
interview. We deleted the Wave 2 reports of these windows, on the grounds that they
very likely were re-reports of the same offer.
7. A survey by Hewitt Associates (Shalowitz 1992) does show a shal"p increase in tlle
number of firms offering windows in 1991-92 compared to the three preceding
years, which is consisten t wi th the message of Table 1.
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8. Tabulations for earlier years suggest offers became more common during the
late 1980s, too. However, reported acceptance rates are higher (averaging 43 percent, with no clear pattern) in 1985-88. This is consistent with poorer reporting of
rejected offers in those years, so I am less confident that the apparent upward trend
of offers in those years is rea!.
9. A few bonus amounts greater than two years salary were deleted as they appear
to be outliers.
10. Amounts are missing for about 30 percent of those receiving these incentives,
usually because respondents did not know the amount. Perhaps surprisingly, amounts
were only slightly more likely to be missing for rejected offers (31 vs. 27 percent).
11. Earnings (measured at the end ofjob forjobs that ended before Wave 1, and at
Wave I for ongoing jobs) were 8 percent higher for those who accepted windows
than for those that rejected them.
12. For cash bonuses, the amounts relative to annual earnings are in line with the 3
to 12 months salary offered to those in the firm studied by Lumsdaine, Stock, and
Wise (1990).
13. The firm size variable is available for those who are currently employed and
received a window offer from their current employer, and for those who are not
working but received an offer from their most recent employer. Size of employer was
not asked in the sequence that deals with the employer before the current/last one.
14. For current hourly wages, I rejected values of In (wage) less than 1 or greater
than 6. A similar procedure was applied to wages on previous jobs, after inflating to
$1992 using the CPI.
15. These variables were obtained for the current job of those working at Wave 1,
and the last job of those who were not working, but not for previous jobs.
16. Birth cohort variables, not shown in Table 8, suggest a weak tendency for
window offers to increase with age. Coefficients of occupation dummies showed no
strong relationship to skillleve!.
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